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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code §
78A-3- 102(3)(j). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
L

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETERSON'S MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES WERE NOT TIMELY?

Standard of Review
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Peterson Plumbing Supply's
mechanics' lien notices were timely filed is a question of statutory interpretation and
therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be given the trial
court's conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, ^ 4 , 182 P.3d
924, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Preservation for Appeal
This issue was preserved for appeal by being addressed in Peterson Plumbing
Supply's Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition to Nullify Liens and
Memorandum [R. 91-95] and in oral argument before the district court on October 8,
2008 [R. 287-98].
II.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETERSON'S MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL LIENS?
Standard of Review
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Peterson Plumbing Supply's
mechanics' liens were wrongful liens is a question of statutory interpretation and
1

therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be given the trial
court's conclusions." Foothill Part LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, ^ 4, 182 P.3d
924, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Preservation for Appeal
This issue was preserved for appeal by being addressed in Peterson Plumbing
Supply's Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition to Nullify Liens and
Memorandum [R. 91-95] and in oral argument before the district court on October 8,
2008 [R. 287-98].

STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
L

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2008).

Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to
such interest as the owner may have in the property
II.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008).

(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property,
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within:
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract if no
notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the day on which
a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. (ii) For purposes of this Subsection
2

(1), final completion of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final
completion of the project, means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the original
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of
issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having
jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a
result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or (C) if
with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of occupancy and
no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local
government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on which
there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the original
contract.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial work
after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), that
subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the sole
purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to
hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original contractor's time
frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1) for
that subcontractor's work.
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: (i)
repair work; or (ii) warranty work.
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding
payment 1o ensure completion of that work.
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii)
the name of the person: (A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first
and last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material
was furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; (v) the
name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of
the lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized
agent; (viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3,
Recording of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as
defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in
Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance
3

with Section 38-11-107.
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to hold
and claim a lien.
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property;
or (ii) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien claimant,
the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner,
using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real property
assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner
precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the
reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix).
III.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (2008).

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or
beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or
notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee,
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which the
4

property is located.
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest,
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal
statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by
the owner of the real property.
IV.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2 (2008).

(l)(a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38-9-6 apply to any
recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on
or after May 5, 1997. (b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens
of record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed, (c) Notwithstanding
Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the provisions of this chapter applicable to the filing of a
notice of interest do not apply to a notice of interest filed before May 5, 2008.
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in
accordance with Section 78B-6-1303 or seeking any other relief permitted by law.
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case presents two question of statutory interpretation: (1) whether or not a

mechanics' lien notice is timely filed under Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) when the notice
of lien is filed within 90 days of the filing of a notice of completion but later than 180
days after final completion of the original contract; and if not, (2) whether an untimely
mechanics' lien notice filed by a party entitled to a lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3 (2008)
renders the mechanics' lien wrongful under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act.

5

Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply is a plumbing materials supplier that
supplied materials for the construction of Appellee Petitioners' condominiums. Peterson
Plumbing Supply was not fully paid for the plumbing materials. Certificates of
occupancy were issued for the condominiums between October and December of 2007.
These certificates evidence final completion of the original contract. Thereafter, notices
of completion for the condominiums were filed in July and August of 2008. Mechanics'
lien notices were also filed by Peterson Plumbing Supply in July and August of 2008.
Petitioners argued before the district court that Peterson Plumbing Supply's
mechanics' lien notices were not timely since they were filed more than 180 days after
final completion of the original contracts even though they were filed within 90 days of
the filing of the notices of completion. Therefore, according to Petitioners, Peterson
Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens were wrongful liens based on Foothill Park, LC v.
Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, 182 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Conversely, Peterson Plumbing Supply argued before the district court that its
mechanics' lien notices were timely since they were filed within 90 days of the filing of
the notices of completion. In addition, Peterson Plumbing Supply argued that its
mechanics' liens were not wrongful liens even if the lien notices were not timely filed.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

1.

On September 17, 2008, Petitioners filed their Verified Petition to Nullify Liens

and Memorandum [R. 1-73].

6

2.

On October 1, 2008, Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its Memorandum in

Opposition to Verified Petition to Nullify Liens and Memorandum [R. 91-95].
3.

On October 8, 2008, Petitioners filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of

Petition to Nullify Liens [R. 99-103].
4.

On October 8, 2008, a Hearing was held before Honorable Samuel D. McVey,

Fourth District Court, Utah County, Provo Department, State of Utah, pursuant to Utah
Code § 38-9-7 (2008), wherein the court granted Petitioners Verified Petition to Nullify
Liens [R. 98, 271-323].
5.

On November 14, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Petition to Nullify

Liens [R. 107-09].
6.

On December 4, 2008, Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its Petition for

Interlocutory Appeal with this Court. [R. 120].
7.

On February 18, 2009, this Court granted Peterson Plumbing Supply's Petition for

Interlocutory Appeal [R. 262].
III.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
On November 14, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Petition to Nullify

Liens wherein the court concluded that the mechanics' lien notices filed by Peterson
Plumbing Supply were not timely filed and that therefore Peterson Plumbing Supply's
mechanics' liens were wrongful liens pursuant to Utah Code § 38-9-7 (2008).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellee Petitioners are the owners of certain individual condominiums which are

part of multi-unit buildings located in Pleasant Grove City, Utah [R. 70-73; 320,ffl[1-12].
2.

Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply is a plumbing materials supplier that

supplied materials for the construction of Petitioners' condominiums [R. 320,ffl[21-23].
3.

The plumbing materials supplied by Peterson Plumbing Supply were supplied

pursuant to a contract with Pace Plumbing, Inc. [R. 70, ^f 26].
4.

Petitioner General Construction & Development, Inc. contracted with Pace

Plumbing, Inc. to do plumbing work on the condominiums [R. 70, ^j 24].
5.

Petitioner General Construction & Development, Inc. developed and built the

condominiums [R. 72, f 2].
6.

Peterson Plumbing Supply was not fully paid by Pace Plumbing, Inc. for the

plumbing materials supplied for the construction of Petitioners' condominiums [R. 4, 6,
8, 9, 13-16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47].
7.

Peterson Plumbing Supply filed mechanics' lien notices against the condominiums

as set forth in the following schedule:
Building

Cert of Occupancy

Notice of Completion

Date of Lien

n

October 11,2007

July 29, 2008

August 6, 2008

V

November 14, 2007

July 29, 2008

August 6, 2008

8

w

October 25, 2007

July 29, 2008

August 6, 2008

X

December 17, 2007

August 8, 2008

July 1, 2008

y

December 4, 2007

August 8, 2008

August 21, 2008

[R. 4-49, 93-94, 102,320-22].
8.

Each mechanics' lien notice was filed within 90 days after a notice of completion

was filed in the Utah State Construction Registry for each of the condominiums as set
forth in the foregoing schedule [R. 93-94, 320-22].
9.

Each mechanics' lien notice was filed more than 180 days after final completion

of the original contract for each of the condominiums as established by the certificates of
occupancy and as set forth in the foregoing schedule [R. 93-94, 320-22].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES FILED BY PETERSON PLUMBING
SUPPLY WERE NOT TIMELY.
The district court held that the mechanics' lien notices filed by Peterson Plumbing

Supply were not timely filed since they were filed more than 180 days after final
completion of the original contracts. However, Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) provides that
mechanics' lien notices are required to be filed "within: (A) 180 days after the day on
which occurs final completion of the original contract if no notice of completion is filed

9

under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is
filed under Section 38-1-33." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008).
A notice of completion was filed for each of the condominiums upon which
Peterson Plumbing Supply filed a mechanics' lien notice. Accordingly, the 180 day
deadline set forth in section 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) was expressly inapplicable. Since Peterson
Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were filed within 90 days of the filing of the
notices of completion, its mechanics' liens were timely.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETERSON
PLUMBING SUPPLY'S MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL
LIENS.
The district court held that Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens were

wrongful under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act based upon its conclusion that the mechanics'
lien notices filed by Peterson Plumbing Supply were not timely. However, Peterson
Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens do not fall within the definition of "wrongful lien"
under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act since mechanics' liens are "expressly authorized" by
statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008); Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, If
52.
Furthermore, Peterson Plumbing Supply was "entitled to a lien under Section 381-3" of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act regardless of whether its mechanics' liens were
enforceable. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008). Accordingly, the district court
erred by nullify Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens under Utah's Wrongful
Lien Act.
10

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES FILED BY PETERSON PLUMBING
SUPPLY WERE NOT TIMELY.
The facts pertinent to this appeal are straightforward. With respect to each

condominium, Peterson Plumbing Supply filed a mechanics' lien notice within 90 days of
the filing of a notice of completion but later than 180 days after final completion of the
original contract [R. 93-94, 320-22]. In finding that Peterson Plumbing Supply's liens
were untimely, the district court interpreted Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) as (1) creating a
maximum lien filing deadline of 180 days from final completion of the original contract,
and (2) providing that the filing of a notice of completion can only reduce, not extend, the
180 day deadline [R. 279].
This interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) is inconsistent with its plain and
unambiguous language, which provides that mechanics' lien claimants
shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property,
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien
within: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days
after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008) (emphasis added).

Under the rules of this Court, "[w]hen examining a statute, we look first to its
plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the
statute. Only if that language is ambiguous do we then turn to a consideration of

11

legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Wilson v. Valley Mental Health,
969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). Furthermore,
a statute should be applied according to its literal wording unless it is
unreasonably confused or inoperable. We must assume that each term in the
statute was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be interpreted
and applied according to its usually accepted meaning. Where the ordinary
meaning of the terms results in an application that is neither unreasonably
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the
statute, it is not the duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of the statutory
scheme.
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).
Interpreting Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) pursuant to the ordinary meaning of its
literal wording is not confusing, does not render the statute inoperable, and would not
result in an application of the statute in blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the
statute (which is to define the time within which a notice of mechanics' lien must be
filed). Rather, the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) manifests that the
legislature intended to limit the time within which to file a mechanics' lien notice to 180
days after final completion of the original contract only when "no notice of completion is
filed." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008).
If a notice of completion /s filed, the plain and unambiguous language of the
statute requires that the lien be filed within "90 days after the day on which a notice of
completion is filed." See id- The accuracy of this interpretation is apparent when Utah
Code § 38-1-7 (2008) is contrasted with its amended version, Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2009).
The 2008 version provides that mechanics' lien claimants
12

shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property,
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien
within: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days
after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008) (emphasis added). In contrast, the 2009

version provides that mechanics' lien claimants
shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property,
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien
no later than: [(l)(a)(i)](A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final
completion of the original contract if no notice of completion is filed under
Section 38-1-33; or [(l)(a)(i)](B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of
completion is filed under Section 38-1-33 but not later than the time frame
established in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2009) (emphasis added).1

The 2009 version contains a 180 day maximum with a potential notice of
completion limitation, but the 2008 version does not contain any such limitation. Rather,
the 180 day period is an alternative to the notice of completion deadline. To hold as the
district court did requires this Court to amend the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7
(2008) to reflect the policy added to the statute by the legislature in 2009. As noted by
this Court, "we should give effect to any omission in the [statutory] language by
presuming that the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \
30, 104 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

1

The 2009 version had not yet been enacted when the district court made its
determination that Peterson Plumbing Supply's liens were not timely under Utah Code §
38-1-7(2008).
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Furthermore, this Court acknowledged that u[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's
Mechanics' Lien Act. . . manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who
perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building
or other improvement. Lien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that
purpose." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^ 8, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102-03 (Utah 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In light of this standard, the narrow construction
adopted by the district court is the antitheses of broadly construing the statute for the
purpose of protecting laborers and material suppliers.
Notably the 2009 amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-7 is a substantive change and
not a mere clarification of the law. While recently interpreting another section of Utah's
Mechanics' Lien Act, this Court observed the following:
While it is true that an amendment to an ambiguous statute may indicate a
legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change
the law, this is not the general rule, and this view of an amendment should be
taken only where there is a strong indication that clarification was, in fact, the
legislative intent.
Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, ^ 16 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). Utah
Code §38-1-7 (2008) is not an ambiguous statute: its meaning is clear especially when its
plain language is contrasted with the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2009).
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the legislature intended for Utah Code § 38-1-7
(2009) to clarify Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008).
It is undisputed that Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its mechanics' lien notice for
each of the condominium within 90 days after each applicable notice of completion was
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filed [R. 93-94, 320-22]. In consideration of the foregoing, the Court should find that
Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were timely filed under a plain
language interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) for the following reasons: (1) it is
presumed that the legislature chose its words advisedly in crafting Utah Code § 38-1-7
(2008); (2) the language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) is not ambiguous; (3) applying
Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) according to its literal wording does not render it confusing,
inoperable, or contradictory to the purpose of the statute; (4) lien statutes should be
broadly construed to protect those furnishing labor and materials to construction projects;
and (5) Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2009) created a substantive change in the law as opposed to
a mere clarification of the law and is therefore not applicable other than as a contrast to
demonstrate the plain meaning of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETERSON
PLUMBING SUPPLY'S MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL
LIENS.
Peterson Plumbing Supply's liens are not wrongful under Utah's Wrongful Lien

Act regardless of whether the Court finds that its liens were untimely because timing has
no effect on whether a mechanics5 lien is wrongful. In nullifying Peterson Plumbing
Supply's liens, the district court found that the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in
Foothill Park, a seminal interpretation of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3), mandated the
conclusion that untimely mechanics' liens are wrongful liens [R. 278-80].
However, the Court of Appeals failed to consider whether mechanics' liens are
"expressly authorized by . . . statute." See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT
15

App 113, 182 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). Since mechanics5 liens are "expressly
authorized by . . . statute," they fall outside the Wrongful Lien Act's definition of
"wrongful lien." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008); Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009
UT 69, K 52.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals failed to utilize the rules of statutory
construction in its analysis of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3). See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston,
Inc., 2008 UT App 113, % 19, 182 P.3d 924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). A more thorough
interpretation of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) leads to the conclusion that the Wrongful Lien
Act is not applicable to this case since Peterson Plumbing Supply was "entitled to a lien
under Section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008).
A.

Peterson Plumbing Supply's Mechanics' Liens are Expressly Authorized by
Statute.
The Wrongful Lien Act's definition of "wrongful lien" does not encompass liens

that are "expressly authorized by . . . statute" such as mechanics' liens. A "wrongful
lien" is defined by the Wrongful Lien Act as follows:
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the
time it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or
another state or federal statute, (b) authorized by or contained in an order or
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008) (emphasis added). This Court recently addressed
the issue of whether mechanics' liens that have been rendered unenforceable due to
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noncompliance with the provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act are nevertheless
"expressly authorized by . . . statute." See Hutterv. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69.
In Hutter, the parties agreed that "a lien is wrongful if it is not 'expressly
authorized by . . . statute,'" but disputed "the meaning of the phrase 'expressly
authorized.'" Id. ^j 46. Dig-It argued "that because the right to file a mechanic's lien is
granted by statute, all mechanic's liens—even if they ultimately prove unenforceable—are
expressly authorized by statute and therefore are not wrongful liens." Id. \ 46. On the
other hand, the Hutters argued "that an unenforceable lien cannot be expressly authorized
by statute since the statute only allows liens to be recorded that comply with the statutory
terms." IcL^f46.
Concluding that "both parties' interpretations [were] plausible readings of the
statutory text" and "that the phrase 'expressly authorized by . . . statute' [was]
ambiguous," the Court "turn[ed] to the statute's legislative history for guidance as to the
legislature's intent." Id ^f 49. After quoting excerpts from a senate floor debate of
comments made by Senators Carling, Matheson and Moll concerning the intended scope
of the Wrongful Lien Act, the Court held as follows:
This legislative history makes clear that the legislature intended that the definition
of "wrongful lien" should encompass only common law liens. Therefore, we
conclude that the phrase "not expressly authorized by . . . statute" in the Wrongful
Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that ultimately prove
unenforceable. Because Dig-It filed a mechanic's lien, which is expressly
authorized by statute, the lien, though unenforceable for the reasons stated above,
is not wrongful....
Id \ 50-52.
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Furthermore, this Court observed that "the Wrongful Lien Act defines 'wrongful
lien' narrowly." Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 2005 UT 59, Tf 10, 123 P.3d
393, 396 (Utah 2005). Interpreting the phrase "authorized by . . . statute" to include only
enforceable statutory liens would create a very broad wrongful lien definition that, when
considering the implications of such a broad definition, was clearly not the legislature's
intent.
For example, Utah Code § 38-9-7 (2008) provides that district courts "shall
schedule a hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful
lien." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-7(3)(b) (2008). A determination of whether a statutory
lien is enforceable often requires an inquiry into contested facts for which an expedited
proceeding is impractical and unsuitable. In contrast, determining whether the right to
file a particular lien is granted by statute without regard to whether the lien is enforceable
can be done efficiently and effectively on an expedited basis.
Moreover, the Wrongful Lien Act vests county recorders with authority to "reject
[the] recording of a lien if the county recorder determines the lien is a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-3(1) (2008). In other words,
county recorders are authorized to reject liens if they determine that the liens are not
"expressly authorized by . .. statute." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008).
In addition, the remedy available to lien claimants whose liens have been rejected
by the county recorder as wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act provides further
evidence that the legislature intended for the phrase "authorized by .. . statute" to simply
18

identify liens that were codified by statute without regard to their enforceability. The
Wrongful Lien Act provides that "[a] lien claimant whose document is rejected [by the
county recorder] may petition the district court... for an expedited determination that the
lien may be recorded or filed." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-6(1) (2008). However,
A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a
contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county recorder. The
proceeding may not determine the truth of the content of the document nor the
property or legal rights of the parties beyond the necessary determination whether
or not the document shall be recorded.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-9-6(4) (2008) (emphasis added).

If the legislature expected that district courts would be able to refer solely to the
"face" of the lien in reviewing a county recorders determination that a "lien [was] a
wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1," then the legislature necessarily must have
expected that the courts would be able determine whether a lien was "authorized by . . .
statute" by examining the "face" of the lien without regard to the "truth of the content" of
the lien. In many cases, district courts cannot determine whether a statutory lien is
enforceable without looking past the "face" of the document. In contrast, whether the
right to file a particular lien is granted by statute can always be determined solely by
reference to the "face" of the contested document.
As the foregoing evidences, Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens are not
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act even if the Court finds that Peterson Plumbing
Supply failed to timely file its mechanics' lien notices since unenforceable mechanic'
liens are still "authorized by . . . statute."
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B.

Peterson Plumbing Supply is "Entitled to a Lien under Section 38-1-3."
Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) provides that the Wrongful Lien Act "does not apply to a

person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38,
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008). In Foothill Park,
the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that untimely mechanics' liens are wrongful liens.
See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113,ffif18-20, 20 n.l 1, 182 P.3d
924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
This conclusion was premised on the notion that a mechanics' lien claimant cannot
be "entitled to a lien" when the lien rights have been voided due to the passage of lien
deadlines. LLfl 17-20. However, this Court of Appeals interpretation of Utah Code §
38-9-2(3) is inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction and the legislative
history of the Wrongful Lien Act. Under the rules of this Court,
Statutory enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful. Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory language meaning
and to assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . . We will avoid
an interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or
inoperative.
Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Center, 2004 UT 15, % 16, 89 P.3d 113, 116 (Utah 2004)
(citations omitted).
In interpreting Utah Code § 38-9-2(3), the Court of Appeals isolated the phrase
"entitled to a lien" from the phrase "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3." See Foothill
Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, Tj 19, 182 P.3d 924, 930 (Utah Ct. App.
2008). As a result, the Court of Appeals defined entitlement to a mechanics' lien
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generally in the overall context of lien validity under the entire Mechanics' Lien Act,
including the filing provisions set forth in Utah Code § 38-1-7 and 38-1-11, rather than
by reference to "section 38-1-3." Id. ^[ 18-20. This interpretation renders the phrase
"under section 38-1-3" irrelevant, meaningless, superfluous, and inoperative. If the
legislature intended for entitlement to be defined by compliance with the Wrongful Lien
Act, then the phrase "under section 38-1-3" is unnecessary.
Moreover, "statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be
interpreted as the exclusion of another. Thus, we should give effect to any omission in
the ordinance language by presuming that the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt
Lake County, 2004 UT 98, Tf 30, 104 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The legislature chose to define whether a lien claimant is
"entitled to a lien" by exclusive reference to "section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. §
38-9-2(3) (2008).
Accordingly, it must be presumed that the legislature's omission of any reference
to the other provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act, or a reference to the Mechanics' Lien
Act in general, evidences legislative intent to restrict the entitlement inquiry to whether
the mechanics' lien claimant is identified in section 38-1-3, which is the section of the
Mechanics Lien Act that defines those who "shall have a lien upon the property":
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or
21

bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or
otherwise . . . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-1-3 (1997).2

Interpreting the phrase "entitled to a lien" in conjunction with the phrase "under
section 38-1-3" leads to a three-prong test for determining whether a lien claimant is
"entitled" to a mechanics' lien: (1) the lien claimant must be identifiable as a contractor,
subcontractor, licensed architect, or as belonging to one of the other groups identified in
Utah Code § 38-1-3; (2) the lien claimant must have "rendered service, performed labor,
or furnished or rented materials or equipment" upon the property; and (3) the work
performed must have been performed "at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise." See UTAH CODE ANN. §38-13 (2008).
If a mechanics' lien is filed and these conditions are met, then the mechanics' lien
claimant is "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3)
(2008). If a mechanics' lien is filed and these conditions are not met, then the mechanics'
lien claimant has filed a common law lien disguised as a mechanics' lien since the lien
claimant is not "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3."

2

Utah Code § 38-1-3 has not been amended since 1994. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3
(2009).
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Furthermore, statutory provisions should be "interpreted in harmony with other
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related
chapters/' Oman v. Davis Sch. DisU 2008 UT 70, If 35, 194 P.3d 956, 966-67 (Utah
2008) (citation omitted). This interpretation of Section 38-9-2(3) is consistent with the
Wrongful Lien Act's definition of "wrongful lien" set forth in Utah Code § 38-9-1(6)
insofar as the definition limits the applicability of the Wrongful Lien Act to common law
liens while Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) ensures that the Wrongful Lien Act is still applicable
to common law liens disguised as mechanics' liens.
To demonstrate, if an individual is irritated with an elected representative and files
a mechanics' lien notice on property owned by the elected representative, but that
individual has not "rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment" to the property, then the individual has filed a common law lien disguised as
a mechanics' lien. Similarly, if a realtor that has successfully sold a client's property
files a mechanics' lien on another parcel of property owned by the client upon the failure
of the client to pay the realtor's commission, then the realtor has filed a common law lien
disguised as a mechanics' lien.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals interpretation of entitlement is at odds with this
Court's interpretation of the Wrongful Lien Act's definition of "wrongful lien."
Although the definition of "wrongful lien" set forth in Utah Code § 38-9-1(6) "does not
include statutory liens that ultimately prove unenforceable," see Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc.,
2009 UT 69, Tf 52, the Court of Appeals interpretation of the scope limitation set forth in
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Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) would apply the Wrongful Lien Act to mechanics' liens that
ultimately prove unenforceable. See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App
113,fflj18-20, 20 n.l 1, 182 P.3d 924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Likewise, the Court of Appeals interpretation is also contrary to the legislative
history of the Wrongful Lien Act. The legislative history laid out by the Court in Hutter
establishes that the legislature, in originally enacting the Wrongful Lien Act, did not
intend for the Wrongful Lien Act to be applicable to invalid mechanics' liens. See Hutter
v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, ^J 50-52. It was for this reason that the original version of the
Wrongful Lien Act provided, "This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics'
or materialmen's liens." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (1985).3 Since then, the legislature
has never manifested an intent to apply the Wrongful Lien Act to mechanics' lien filed by
lien claimants identified in Utah Code § 38-1-3 regardless of the enforceability of the
mechanics' lien claim.
In addition, the other amendments to the Wrongful Lien Act in 1997 reinforce the
conclusion that the determination of whether a document is a wrongful lien is to be made
by a facial review of the documents and not by an adjudication of timeliness, accuracy or
other factors affecting the validity of the lien. Although the penalty provisions of the
Since this language does not address the standing of the lien claimant, it leaves open the
possibility of the filing of common law liens disguised as mechanics liens. Interpreting
Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) as advocated herein closes that loophole while still preserving the
overarching purpose of the Wrongful Lien Act: "to impose penalties on those filing
common law liens on the property of public officials in retaliation for prosecution." See
Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, ^50.
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original version of the Wrongful Lien Act served as an incentive for those inclined to file
groundless common law liens to remove those liens after they were filed, it did not
provide a mechanism by which county recorders could prevent the filing of groundless
common law liens or for expedited adjudication of wrongful lien claims. See UTAH
CODE ANN.

§38-9-4(1985).

In 1997, the Wrongful Lien Act was amended to vest county recorders with
authority to prevent the filing of groundless common law liens, see UTAH CODE ANN. §
38-9-3 (1997) ("A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder
determines the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1."), and to expedite the
process by which those burdened with groundless common law liens could remove the
liens from their property, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-7 (1997) ("the court shall
schedule a hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful
lien").
Under the original version of the Wrongful Lien Act, county recorders would not
be able to easily identify wrongful liens since they were defined by what was subjectively
known by the person filing the lien. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (1985) ("A person
who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property, who causes or
has caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of the
county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the document is forged,
groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim . .. ." (emphasis added)).
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To aid county recorders (who could now refuse to record wrongful liens) and
district courts (which now had to determine whether a lien was wrongful at an expedited
proceeding) in determining whether a particular lien was wrongful, the legislature crafted
an objective, concise definition of what constitutes a wrongful lien:
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not: (al expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or
federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a
document signed by the owner of the real property.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-9-1(6) (1997) (emphasis added).

In crafting the definition of "wrongful lien" in such a way as to identify common
law liens by entirely excluding statutory liens from the wrongful lien definition, it was no
longer necessary for the legislature to explicitly state that the Wrongful Lien Act was
"not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens" as it did in the
original version of the Wrongful Lien Act. Nonetheless, the legislature still found it
desirable to provide that the Wrongful Lien Act "does not apply to a person entitled to a
lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1." UTAH CODE
ANN. §38-9-2(3) (1997).4
In view of the fact that county recorders do not have the expertise to adjudicate the
timeliness or other factors affecting the validity of a lien, it would make little sense for
this Court to adopt the logic of Foothill Park by expanding the entitlement inquiry to
4

Section 38-9-2(3) has not been substantively amended since 1997. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2009).
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whether the mechanics' lien claimant has complied with the filing provisions of the
Mechanics' Lien Act. On the other hand, it makes a great deal of sense for the legislature
to attempt to prevent the filing of common law liens disguised as mechanics' liens by
providing that the Wrongful Lien Act is not applicable "to a person entitled to a lien
under Section 38-1-3."
In this case, Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were not
common law liens disguised as mechanics' liens. Peterson Plumbing Supply is (1) a
plumbing materials supplier that (2) supplied materials for the construction of Petitioners'
condominiums (3) pursuant to a contract with Pace Plumbing, Inc.5 Since Peterson
Plumbing Supply "is entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3" and filed its lien pursuant to
the Mechanics' Lien Act, the Wrongful Lien Act is not applicable even if the Court finds
that Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were not timely filed.
CONCLUSION
Peterson Plumbing Supply respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district
court's determination that Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens were not timely
filed. In addition, Peterson Plumbing Supply respectfully requests that the Court reverse
the district court's nullification of Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens under
the Wrongful Lien Act.

5

Petitioner General Construction & Development, Inc., the entity that developed and
built the condominiums, contracted with Pace Plumbing, Inc. to do pluming work on the
condominiums.
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of December, 2009.

t>ML^
JA T. FARMER
GARRETT A. WALKER
Attorneys for Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT PETERSON
PLUMBING SUPPLY to the following this 18th day of December, 2009:
Paul D. Dodd
Fillmore Spencer, LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
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